INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Few departures in position in finance are as vexing as that of establishing consistent and reliable returns predictability from past returns using technical trading rules and chart patterns across markets and over time. While technical analysis, ridiculed as "alchemy" by Burton Malkiel in his 1973 book "A Random Walk Down Wall Street", challenges the formidable market efficiency orthodoxy (Fama, 1970) , there is pervasive use by practitioners and the persistence of belief in technical analysis techniques (see survey studies in Park and Irwin, 2007, and Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007) . However, the intellectual vacuum at the core of technical analysis -that efficient markets remove possible short-term patterns and autocorrelations in stock returns -has been increasingly filled up in recent times by growing receptiveness that markets may not be fully efficient because of noise trading (Kyle, 1985; Black, 1986) , that herding behavior of short-horizon traders can result in informational inefficiency (Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1992) and self-fulfilling tendencies (Frankel and Froot, 1990) , and that prices may be affected by behavioural biases (Barberis, Schleifer and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Kent, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Hirshleifer, 2001; Shiller, 2003) .
Such peripheral views get reinforced the more difficult market conditions are, when techniques based on profits and valuations failed (Talley, 2002) , especially during the recent financial crisis (Avgouleas, 2009) , and with the growing influence of quantitative hedge funds that employ the automation of technical trading rules as one of their investment strategies (Lo and Hasanhodzic, 2009) . Still, the profitability of using technical trading rules based on past prices remains an open empirical question, albeit an extensively examined one.
We tread a different path in our study by exploring the potential source of the returns of technical trading rules at the firm-level, an issue that has not been commonly explored in prior studies.
We are motivated to examine this because of the parallel observation of a reported decline in technical trading profitability in U.S. over time (Sullivan, Timmermann and White, 1999; LeBaron, 2000; Kwon and Kish, 2002; Ready, 2002; Schulmeister, 2009) , and a lower synchronicity of U.S. stock prices, or higher idiosyncratic volatility of individual firms, over time as the U.S. economy developed (Morck, Yeung and Yu, 2000 , hereafter termed MYY).
The popular explanation for this profitability decline in deploying technical trading rules is that markets have become more efficient and hence such opportunities have disappeared. This is especially so with the advent of cheaper computing power to spark the proliferation of computerdriven trading, the growth of electronic communication networks (ECNs) that allow thousands of buy and sell orders to be matched at the speed of light without any human intervention 1 ; the increasing popularity of "dark pool" platform where buyers and sellers can anonymously match large blocks of stock and keep details of the deals and prices concealed to prevent distorting prices in the broader 1 According to the New York Stock Exchange daily public disclosure, program trading accounts for about 20-25% and as high as 80% of the trading volume on that exchange every day.
market; and the lower transaction costs; all of which are helping to remove possible short-term patterns and autocorrelations in stock returns.
Similar to MYY, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (CLMX, 2001 ) also found a secular decline in stock return synchronicity in the United States from 1960 to 1997, but they do not link it to cross-sectional returns. This time-series observation suggests that there could be a cross-sectional relationship between technical trading profitability and stock return synchronicity at the firm-level.
Thus, the source of the profitability (or losses) of technical trading rules could be due to varying degrees of firm-level synchronicity with the market, a relationship that has not been explored in prior literature.
We like to emphasize that our study is more concerned about investigating the source of the returns from the technical trading rules by testing its association with stock return synchronicity, rather than focusing on establishing the highly contentious point of whether the technical trading rules are indeed profitable and robust to problems such as data-snooping biases (Sullivan, Timmerman and White, 1999) , since we acknowledge that these trading rules might perhaps not work for certain stocks at the firm-level, and we want to know what are the predictors that determine the trading profits or losses from applying these technical rules.
Inspired by Roll (1988) , MYY is the first in a series of papers that uses the R 2 of a regression of individual stock returns on the market return as a measure of synchronicity, or the extent to which the stock prices of individual firms within a country move together. R 2 is also the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to systematic volatility; idiosyncratic volatility is thus the inverse measure of synchronicity. In sum, lower R 2 , or higher idiosyncratic volatility of individual firms, indicates lower synchronicity of stock returns. Roll (1988) offers an interesting discussion of R 2 , observing that the low R 2 statistics among U.S. stocks and for common asset pricing models is due to vigorous firmspecific return variation not associated with identifiable news releases and public information. He concludes that this implies "either private information or else occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information (noise)". The incorporation of either firm-specific information or noise both result in a lower R 2 , but these two effects lead to starkly different predictions of the relation between R 2 and expected stock returns:
(a) The Price-Informativeness Hypothesis: If a low R 2 is largely resulted from the firm's environment causing the stock prices to aggregate more firm-specific information, greater firm-specific uncertainty is resolved such that market factors should explain a smaller proportion of the variation in stock returns, increasing the realized historical idiosyncratic volatility, and investors holding these stocks should require lower expected returns.
(b) The Noise Hypothesis: If a low R 2 is largely attributable to the trading by noise traders, stocks will have lower synchronicity with market factors and lower R 2 because the changes in stock prices cannot be fully justified by changes in fundamental risks reflected in the common factors, and investors should earn higher expected returns according to Waldmann (1989, 1990) .
Both finance and accounting research had tilted overwhelmingly in favor of the PriceInformativeness Hypothesis, in that R 2 or stock return synchronicity is a measure for how much private information is impounded into stock prices. When informed trading activity is generated, it contributes to the lower R 2 (or increase in idiosyncratic volatility). This is in the spirit of the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argument who predict that improving the cost-benefit trade-off on private information collection leads to more extensive informed trading and to more informative pricing. In a market with many risky stocks, the ones with cheaper information about their fundamental values are more attractive to traders. Accordingly, traders acquire more information about these stocks and their prices are more volatile and more informative than the prices of stocks with more costly information. Private information is turned into public information, thereby reducing the adverse selection problem of uninformed investors trading with informed investors.
At the country-level, MYY (2000) find that stock prices are more synchronous (i.e. have higher R 2 ) in emerging markets which are low-income countries with weak protection of investors'
and property rights; weak institutions discourage the acquisition of information about individual stocks and such markets lack informed traders because risk arbitrageurs find it more costly to keep their profits in such economies. However, there are mixed results when the country-level findings are examined at the firm-level. On one hand, Durnev, Morck, Yeung and Zarowin (2003) find evidence that firm with lower R 2 exhibit higher associations between current returns and future earnings, suggesting that lower R 2 is indicative of better informationally-efficient prices. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) find that both institutional and insider trading are positively associated with idiosyncratic volatility. In other words, stocks with higher institutional trading and insider trading have lower R 2 , since institutional trading accelerates the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices, and consequently, lowers R 2 .
On the other hand, in a widely-cited paper, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) report that stocks with low R 2 (or high idiosyncratic volatility) is associated with "abysmally low returns". The average differential between quintile value-weighted portfolios of the lowest and highest idiosyncratic volatility is about -1.06 percent per month. Ang (2009) also confirm that the link also exists in 23 other developed markets. The Noise Hypothesis is originated by Shiller (1981) who finds that the level of stock price volatility is too high to be explained by the volatility in the underlying fundamentals, e.g. dividends. Other studies suggest that behavioural factors, bubbles, herding, and other non-fundamental factors affect stock return volatility (see Shleifer (2000) for a review), and ultimately the usefulness of the synchronicity measure as a gauge of firm-specific information.
Behavioural models, like Barberis and Huang (2001) predict that lower R 2 stocks earn higher expected returns. In environments with frictions and incomplete information (Merton, 1987) and limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) Exchange had higher trading volumes than Shanghai. As an emerging market, China has a very high ratio of stocks changing hands. Wong (2006) reported that the turnover velocity of stocks, defined as the total transaction volume divided by the total number of tradable shares, was about 500 percent, suggesting the prevalence of noise trading in China. Moreover, some countries, including China, place asymmetric restrictions on the price formation process, such as short-selling constraints, which impede the impounding of bad news into prices in a timely manner and contribute to the high comovement of stock prices (Miller, 1977; Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu, 2003) . Jin and Myers (2006) , consistent with the PriceInformativeness Hypothesis, and generally for older and bigger stocks with lower turnover and higher market-to-book ratio. Thus, without the guide of R 2 , investors should take the market prognosis by all these "alchemists" with their "voodoo" charts with a heavy dose of salt. We also reconciled the lively debate and extremely mixed evidence on the interpretation of R 2 and its relationship with the crosssectional returns of stocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the literature review and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the data, variable description and construction, and methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results, while Section 5 examines the robustness of the results in sub-periods. Section 6 concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Technical Trading Rules
Two empirical papers were particularly important in supporting the predictive capabilities of technical trading rules. Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (BLL, 1992) White's (2000) Reality Check bootstrap methodology to correct for data-snooping biases and find that the trading rules examined do not generate superior out-of-sample performance. BLL acknowledged that possible data snooping biases remain when they use a range of rules chosen ex post. They argue that such dangers are minimized by the deliberate choice of a simple class of rules that has been in common use for a long period of time. Interestingly, STW acknowledged that they found BLL insample results to be robust to data-snooping over the 100-year period in BLL (1992).
However, our study is more concerned about investigating the source of the returns from the technical trading rules by testing its association with stock return synchronicity, rather than focusing on establishing the highly contentious point of whether the technical trading rules are indeed profitable and robust to problems such as data-snooping biases (Sullivan, Timmerman and White, 1999 ), since we acknowledge that these trading rules might perhaps not work for certain stocks at the firm-level, and we want to know what are the predictors that determine the trading profits or losses from applying these technical rules.
There are surprisingly few papers that examine the value of technical analysis in China. Chen and Li (2006) found weak evidence for technical trading profits over the period from 1994 to 2002, but only for 39 companies which cover "23 percent of the daily turnover of the entire A-share market".
There are some supporting evidence that technical analysis add value in emerging markets (Bessembinder and Chan, 1995; Ito, 1999) , but Ratner and Leal (1999) found the opposite results after correcting for data-snooping bias and adjusting for round-trip transaction costs, while Chen, Huang and Lai (2009) found there is a sharp decline in trading profits after implementing a one-day lag scheme to account for non-synchronous trading bias in eight Asian markets. These studies exclude
China in their analysis.
Given the extraordinary growth in China to become the world's third largest stock market in recent years which were not in the sample period of most prior studies, it should be interesting to fill the gap in the extant literature findings by examining the source of returns predictability from deploying technical trading rules in a highly synchronous but fast-changing market like China.
R 2 or Stock Return Synchronicity
The dominant interpretation of R 2 , or stock return synchronicity, is an important issue because prior research suggests that more informative stock prices, measured by lower R 2 , lead to better resource allocation, and therefore functional efficiency with efficient stock prices directing capital to the highest-value users, which has implications for economic growth (Tobin, 1982; Wurgler, 2000; Yeung, 2004, Wang, Wu and .
Since the influential studies by MYY (2000) and CLMX (2001) documenting the trend of lower R 2 over time, many proposed explanations have been instrumental in supporting the Price Informativeness story, that is, low R 2 is a reasonable measure for the quality of the information environment at either the country-level or the firm-level.
In particular, at the country-level, MYY find that stock prices are more synchronous (i.e. have higher R 2 ) in emerging markets which are low-income countries with weak protection of investors'
and property rights; weak institutions discourage the acquisition of information about individual stocks and such markets lack informed traders because risk arbitrageurs find it more costly to keep their profits in such economies. At the firm-level, Durnev, Morck, Yeung and Zarowin (2003) find evidence that firm with lower R 2 exhibit higher associations between current returns and future earnings, suggesting that lower R 2 is indicative of better informationally-efficient prices. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) find that stocks with higher institutional trading and insider trading have lower R 2 .
There is also evidence that Increased institutional ownership (Bennett, Sias, and Starks, 2003; Xu and Malkiel, 2003) is associated with lower R 2 . The idea is that Institutional trading contributes to private information collection and accelerates the incorporation of firm-specific information into stock prices (Hartzell and Starks, 2003) , and provides a better explanation for a lower R 2 . Hutton, Marcus and
Tehranian (2010) find that R 2 decreases with information transparency. Ferreira and Laux (2007) show that firms with better corporate governance (as measured by having fewer anti-takeover provisions) display higher trading activity, better information about future earnings in stock prices, and lower R 2 . Irvine and Pontiff (2009) found that lower R 2 could be due to product markets becoming more competitive.
In a widely-cited paper, Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) The Noise Hypothesis is originated by Shiller (1981) who finds that the level of stock price volatility is too high to be explained by the volatility in the underlying fundamentals, e.g. dividends.
West ( is positively associated with bubbles, fad, and other non-fundamental factors. Recent evidence by Brandt, Brav, Graham and Kumar (2010) show that the trend of lower R 2 is a speculative episodic event driven by low-priced stocks dominated by retail traders and that there is a reversal to higher R 2 (or lower idiosyncratic firm volatility) during the 2000s, using small trades data from ISSM/TAQ and brokerage data. Other direct or implicit opposing explanations of the Price Informativeness story view include firm fundamentals become more volatile, such as an increase in the variance of return on equity (Wei and Zhang 2006) or opaqueness in financial accounting information (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 2006) ; newly listed firms becoming increasingly younger (Fink et al. 2009 ) and riskier (Brown and Kapadia 2007) .
Rebutting the widely-cited claims by Ang et al (2006) , Fu (2009) reports that expected idiosyncratic volatility, estimated using the EGARCH model, is positively correlated with stock returns. Duffee (1995) found a positive contemporaneous relation between realized monthly idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns. Bali and Cakici (2008) show that the results in Ang et al (2006) are sensitive to the methodology used to form volatility portfolios and to the data frequency used to estimate idiosyncratic volatility, and that the negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and expected returns disappears in the equal-weighted returns. Huang, Liu, Rhee and Zhang (2010) point out that the results in Ang et al (2006) may be driven by monthly return reversals.
Other studies supporting the Noise Hypothesis suggest that behavioural factors, bubbles, herding, and other non-fundamental factors affect stock return volatility (see Shleifer (2000) for a review), and ultimately the usefulness of the synchronicity measure as a gauge of firm-specific information. Behavioural models, like Barberis and Huang (2001) predict that lower R 2 stocks earn higher expected returns. In environments with frictions and incomplete information (Merton, 1987) and limits to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) , R 2 (or the idiosyncratic volatility of a stock) is linked to its expected return. Merton (1987) suggests that, in the presence of incomplete markets where investors have limited access to information, firm-specific risk cannot be fully diversified away, and thus firms with low R 2 require higher average returns to compensate investors for holding imperfectly diversified portfolios. In the influential "limits of arbitrage" argument by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , arbitrageurs tend to avoid stocks with low R 2 (or high idiosyncratic volatility) during the holding period, allowing these stocks to enjoy higher expected returns whose mispricing are not arbitraged away. These arbitrageurs care more about the short-run performance, because they use capital provided by investors, who tend to withdraw funds if the short-run performance is poor. Thus, they desire to keep the ratio of reward-to-risk over shorter horizons high and are less willing to take large positions in these stocks and thus the largest mispricing are found in these stocks which receive the least arbitrage resources.
In addition, Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) also find significant changes in firms' R 2 values surrounding additions and deletions to the S&P 500 Index in the U.S., consistent with market frictions influencing synchronicity. Since additions and deletions to indices do not signal new information to the market regarding firms' fundamentals, the changes in firm's R 2 values surrounding changes in the composition of indices is inconsistent with an information-based explanation of the R 2 measure. Consistent with the noise-in-returns interpretation of the R 2 measure, Kumar and Lee (2006) find that noise traders (uninformed retail investors) have a significant influence on stock price synchronicity. Thus, the findings of Barberis et al. (2005) and Kumar and Lee (2006) Mashruwala, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2006) and .
Hypotheses
We posit that the source of the profitability (or losses) of technical trading rules could be due to varying degrees of firm-level synchronicity with the market, a relationship that has not been explored in prior literature. Yet, in the cross-sectional relationship between technical trading profitability and stock return synchronicity, the direction is unclear due to the two competing hypotheses, namely Price Informativeness Hypothesis and Noise Hypothesis. Given that China appears to be a "noisy" market, we posit that there is a positive relationship in the regression of technical trading returns on ψ i , which is the inverse measure of R 2 or lack of stock return synchronicity (we will explain the rationale for transforming the variable in Section 3.2), that is, a higher ψ i or lack of stock return synchronicity (or lower R 2 ) is associated with higher technical trading returns. In other words, the coefficient on the synchronicity measure ψ i is positively significant.
Our paper is similar in spirit to Teoh, Yang and Zhang (TYZ, 2009) The declining synchronicity of China stock prices, or the declining fraction of China stock return variation explained by the market as measured by R 2 , the statistic from running a market model regression using weekly returns including dividend income from 1991 to 2009, using our sample size of 740 companies which represents around 90% of the population of stocks on Shanghai Stock Exchange in terms of market capitalization. Returns and indexes data are from Datastream. Note that the R 2 in MYY (2000) for China in 1995 was 45.3% reported in their Panel C of Table 2 which is consistent with MYY. Figure 1 graphs the average R 2 across stocks, based on weekly returns from 1991 to 2009. We observe an overall declining trend in R 2 . This brought us to the attention on whether there are any time-series dynamics that could possibly affect the cross-sectional relationship between stock return synchronicity and technical trading returns. We examine this issue further in Section 4.
We like to emphasize that we do not explore the time-series dynamics on why R 2 is declining over time; rather, we are more interested in what this time-series trend for our main predictor in the synchronicity measure implies for the direction of the cross-sectional relationship between stock return synchronicity and technical trading returns. Specifically, we want to find out whether or not there is a structural break in the beta coefficient for the synchronicity measure ψ i . If so, it will be unclear whether the relationship of higher returns from lower R 2 stocks still holds.
But what sub-period(s) should we investigate to assess whether our results are robust? To avoid data-snooping biases (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990) should flip to the negative sign during the post-NTS sub-period. As a result, we hypothesize that low R 2 stocks will now have lower returns from the technical trading rules (not higher as were under the Noise Hypothesis) after the NTS reform where there is an economically significant fundamental shock to the information environment.
DATA, VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND CONSTRUCTION, AND RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
We draw the data for our study from the Datastream database. Our initial sample includes all 847 firms traded on the Shanghai Composite Index since the inception of the Shanghai Stock
Exchange from 2 Jan 1991 to 31 December 2009. After removing firms with more than 100 days of zero returns in any year in the construction of our returns from technical trading rules, requiring firms to have a minimum of 40 weeks of non-zero returns to estimate our synchronicity measure ψ i , and that the sample to contain data for the control variables which include Market-to-Book, Size, Leverage, Dividend Payout ratio, Turnover, and Firm Age, we are left with a final sample of 740 firms that represent, on average, 90 percent of the initial population of stocks in terms of market capitalization.
Technical Trading Rules
Following BLL ( signals are emitted when the short moving average cuts the long moving average from below (above) and moves beyond it by the pre-specified band. Once a signal is emitted, VMA rules call for the position to be maintained until the short and long moving averages cross again, while FMA rules hold the position for a fixed number of days. We evaluate FMA strategies with fixed holding periods of ten days.
(b) Trading Range Break (TRB): TRB rules involve comparing the current price to the recent minimum and maximum. TRB rules emit buy signals when the current price exceeds the recent maximum by at least a pre-specified band, and emit sell signals when the current price falls below the recent minimum by at least the pre-specified band. The rationale for this rule is that when the current price reaches the previous peak, a great deal of selling pressure arises because many people would like to sell at the peak. However, if the price exceeds the previous peak, it is indicated that the upward trend has been initiated. Like BLL (1992), we evaluate separate TRB rules where recent minimums and maximums are defined as the extreme observations recorded over the prior 50, 150, and 200 days, respectively. We use bands of 0 and 1 percent, making for a total of six TRB combinations, and then evaluate each TRB rule using fixed investment horizons of 10 days.
Synchronicity Measure ψ i
MYY (2000) is the first in a series of papers that uses the R 2 of a regression of individual stock returns on the market return as a measure of synchronicity, or the extent to which the stock prices of individual firms within a country move together. R 2 is also the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to systematic volatility; idiosyncratic volatility is thus the inverse measure of synchronicity.
Thus, lower R 2 , or higher idiosyncratic volatility of individual firms, indicates lower synchronicity of stock returns. Following MYY (2000), we estimate firm-specific return variation using a two-factor international model which includes both the local and U.S. market index returns:
using weekly return data; where r it is the return of stock i in period t; r mt is the value-weighted local market return; and r USt is the value-weighted U.S. market return.
Like MYY (2000) and other international studies, we use weekly returns to deal with infrequent trading in international markets. 
Thus, our predictor variable ψ i measures idiosyncratic volatility relative to market-wide variation, or the lack of synchronicity with the market. One reason for scaling idiosyncratic volatility by the total variation in returns is that firms in some industries are more subject to economy-wide shocks than others, and firm-specific events may be correspondingly more intense. Additionally, this scaling and transformation allow for comparability to other studies. We do not add control variables to our price regression in (1) because MYY (2000) view the R 2 as a summary measure of the amount of information reflected in returns.
Relationship between Stock Return Synchronicity and Returns from Technical Trading Rules
We examine the relationship between technical trading returns and stock return synchronicity R 2 by estimating the following basic model:
where TTR i is Technical Trading Returns calculated using the methodology by BLL (1992) discussed in section 2.1; the synchronicity measure ψ i is estimated from a market model that was discussed in section 2.2; Firm Controls include those commonly used in the literature, namely, Size (defined as the logarithmic of market value); Leverage (net debt over book equity); Dividend Payout ratio (dividend over net profits); Turnover (annual volume over number of shares outstanding); Firm Age (the number of years the company first appears on the Shanghai Exchange). We control for turnover as volume may provide relevant information if prices do not react immediately to new information (Blume, Easley and O'Hara, 1994) .
The Price-Informativeness Hypothesis supports the view that expected returns from the predictor variable would be low; thus, the beta coefficient on the synchronicity measure ψ i will be negative, that is, a higher ψ i (lower R 2 ) is associated with lower returns from the technical trading rules. On the other hand, a positive beta coefficient on ψ i is consistent with the Noise Hypothesis, that is, a lower R 2 is associated with higher returns.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Summary Statistics of Sample Characteristics and Returns from Technical Trading Rules
The summary statistics of R 2 , other sample characteristics and the average return from the three technical trading rules are reported in Panel A of Table 1 . The average R 2 is 25 percent, which is a significant decline from the 45 percent reported in MYY (2000) . Panel B of Table 1 reports the cross-sectional average of the correlation among the sample characteristics; most of the sample characteristics do not appear to be highly correlated with our main synchronicity predictor ψ i .
The average annualized mean buy returns from the three technical trading rules are reported in Panel C of Table 1 . Because China does not allow for short-selling of stocks, we report only the mean buy returns generated from the buy signal in the technical trading rules. They range from 22-42 percent (22-24 percent for VMA, 17-24 percent for FMA, and 22-47 percent for TRB), which is significantly higher than the unconditional annualized average return of 8 percent, and also higher than the 12 percent reported by BLL (1992) for U.S. Dow Jones index.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A presents the summary statistics of the sample characteristics. The construction details are described in Section 2. Panel B reports the cross-sectional average of the correlation among the sample characteristics. Results in Panel C are for daily data from January 1991 to December 2009 where mean buy returns using technical trading rules are annualized. Rules are identified as (short, long, band) where short and long are the short and long moving averages respectively, and band is the percentage difference that is needed to generate a signal. Because China does not allow for short-selling of stocks, we report only the mean buy returns generated from the buy signal in the technical trading rules. Note that the unconditional annualized average return is 8%. 
Properties of R 2 Deciles and Univariate Analysis
From Table 2 , we find that low R 2 stocks are generally smaller, younger, have a lower dividend payout ratio, and a higher leverage ratio. According to Baker and Wurgler (2006) , such stocks are more difficult to value and their prices tend to be affected by investor sentiment, and they are more difficult to arbitrage, which could potentially result in these stocks having higher expected returns to compensate investors as argued earlier in the "limits of arbitrage" insight proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and consistent with the Noise Hypothesis. Interestingly, there is not any significant difference between the lowest decile R 2 stocks and the highest ones in the market-to-book ratio. Also, high R 2 stocks have a higher turnover ratio.
In addition, returns from technical trading rules have a negative association with stock return synchronicity, or the R 2 . Thus, we find evidence in favor of the Noise Hypothesis in that stocks with lower R 2 earn higher profits from technical trading rules. Sorting the sample by R 2 into deciles of 10 portfolios, we find that the technical trading returns in N1 (lowest R 2 portfolio) exceeds that in N10
(highest R 2 portfolio) by an annualized 10-37 percent over the sample period, depending on the type of technical trading rule that is employed. In particular, the spread differential between the highest and lowest R 2 portfolios is the highest for the TRB technical trading rule.
In the next section, we carry out a multivariate regression analysis of equation (3) outlined in Section 2.3 to control for the firm-level characteristics (market-to-book, size, leverage, dividend payout ratio, turnover, and firm age) in order to ensure that our findings of the negative relationship between technical trading returns and stock return synchronicity are robust. Stocks are sorted into deciles of 10 portfolios based on the level of their average R 2 over the sample period from low (L) to high (H).
Multivariate Regression
The multivariate analysis of the regression model from Section 2.3 to investigate the relationship between technical trading returns and synchronicity is presented in the result is consistent since investors may demand a liquidity premium for low liquidity stocks which are more costly to trade. Dasgupta et al (2010) find that younger firms tend to have significantly lower R 2 than do older firms, since the new information content (surprise) is larger for younger firms (Dubinsky and Johaness, 2006) and that would drive higher firm-specific return variation. Thus, their results suggest that younger firms have higher returns according to the Noise Hypothesis. However, the findings that larger stocks have higher technical trading returns is a counter-intuitive and important result because of the well-known "size effect" documented by Black (1976) BLL (1992) discussed in section 2.1; the synchronicity measure ψ i is estimated from a market model that was discussed in section 2.2; Firm Controls include those commonly used in the literature, namely, Size (defined as the logarithmic of market value); Leverage (net debt over book equity); Dividend Payout ratio (dividend over net profits); Turnover (annual volume over number of shares outstanding); Firm Age (the number of years the company first appears on the Shanghai Exchange). Panel A, B, and C regress technical trading returns from applying the VMA, FMA and TRB rule on the synchronicity measure and firm controls respectively. Model (1) The largest shareholder controls more than 40 percent of the total shares in around 80 percent of listed firms, while the second largest shareholder typically owns less than 10 percent.
The conflicting incentives of controlling and minority shareholders caused by this split-share ownership structure can lead to significant inefficiencies inside the firm Vishny, 1986, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 2003) . It has been argued that prior to the NTS reform, managers focused too much on book value, since any trades of state shares or legal shares approved by the CSRC took place at book value (Allen et al, 2007) . Aharony, Lee and Wong (2000) documented that Chinese SOEs engage in financial packaging for public listing. Allen et al (2005) showed that China's formal sector (consisting of state-controlled firms) underperforms the "informal sector" of non-state-owned firms. Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) provide evidence that accounting income in China lacks timely incorporation of economic loss because of political influence on financial reporting practices.
Piotroski, Wong and Zhang (2009) find that state-controlled firms suppress negative financial information around visible political events. Since the blockholders could not sell their shares, they were inclined to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders (LaPorta et al, 2002; Wei, Xie and Zhang, 2005; Cao, Dybvig and Qiu, 2007; Cheung et al, 2009; Chen, Jian and Xu, 2009 ). There is also evidence of significant cash transfer or tunnelling of resources via related lending from listed firms back to controlling owners after related-party transactions (Jian and Wong, 2008) . State shareholders are also less inclined to discipline their CEOs (Chang and Wong, 2009 ).
On 31 During the reform, many new regulatory policies were launched, such as new accounting standards which aimed to improve transparency and to protect the interest of minority shareholders 7 .
Structural Break Analysis
In the last section, we find that model (3) has the highest adjusted R 2 for all three technical trading rules. We select model (3) to carry out our Chow Test to examine whether the coefficient on synchronicity is different in the two sub-periods, that is, pre-and post-NTS reform (1992-04/2005 and 4 From the latter half of 1998 to the first half of 1999, the Chinese government began an explorative trial to decrease state shares (known as Guoyougu Jianchi). 24, 2001 , the government announced that it would sell some fraction of its remaining shares to ordinary investors, suddenly giving credibility and clarity to an ambiguously worded prior statement on future privatization (Calomiris et al, 2008) . Again, considering the poor market reaction, the regulation was suspended on 22 October 2001 and cancelled on 23 June 2002. 5 The CSRC outlines the format for compensating existing shareholders and also imposes lockups and restrictions on the amount of G shares that can be sold immediately after they become tradable. More specifically, the new plan stipulates that G shares are not to be traded or transferred within 12 months after the implementation of the share structure reform. Shareholders owning more than 5% of the original non-tradable shares can only trade less than 5% of the total shares outstanding within one year and less than 10% within 2 years. These restrictions of G share sales are intended to reduce the downward pressure on the stock price, maintain market stability and protect the interests of public investors. The details of the "fully floating plan" for a firm, including the number of G shares to be granted to each Class A shareholder and the time window (e.g., one to three years) of G shares become fully floating, must be approved by two thirds of Class A shareholders of the firm. 6 The first batch of the four pilot companies is Tsinghua Tongfang, Hebei Jinniu Energy Resources, Shanghai Zijiang Enterprises Group and Sany Heavy Industry. 7 Other complementary policy measures must be undertaken before outside investors are willing to devote costly resources to the production of information. Ball (2001) argued that simply transporting rules from one economic environment to another can be unfruitful. Overall improvement in price informativeness is concentrated in countries with a strong macro infrastructure in terms of the efficiency of the judicial system, investor protection, and financial reporting.
5/2005-2009).
We implement the three different trading rules (VMA (150, 1, 0) , FMA (150, 1, 0, 10), TRB (150, 0, 10) ) in the two sub-periods to obtain the returns for our sample of stocks. The synchronicity measure ψ i and the firm control factors for each sub-period are calculated using the same approach as outlined in the previous sections. Thus, we have:
TTR 2i = α 2 + β 2 ψ 2i + γ 2 Firm Control 2i + ε 2 where i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n2
and the corresponding null hypotheses: The probability values for these tests are given in Table 4 and we reject the null hypotheses that the coefficient on the synchronicity measure ψ i is equal. Thus, there exists a structural break preand post-NTS reform (i.e. before and after 5/2005).
Empirical Results of the Relationship between Technical Trading Returns and Synchronicity Pre-and Post NTS Reform
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The average annualized mean buy returns from the three technical trading rules in the two sub-periods are reported in Table 5 . The technical trading returns are negative during the pre-NTS reform sub-period, ranging from -4 to -33 percent depending on the technical rules applied, compared to the unconditional annualized average return of -15 percent. Post-NTS reform, the technical trading returns are hugely positive, ranging from 35 to 65 percent depending on the technical rules applied, which is better than the unconditional annualized average return of 25 percent. Table 6 show the important result that the sign of the coefficient in the synchronicity measure ψ i for the VMA and FMA technical rule flips from positive during the pre-NTS reform period and to negative during the post-NTS reform period as hypothesized. While the sign for the TRB rule remains positive, it has now become insignificant. In other words, lower R 2 stocks will now have lower returns from the technical trading rules (not higher as were under the Noise Hypothesis) after the NTS reform.
When there is an economically significant fundamental shock to the information environment as was the case for the NTS reform, R 2 is now a proxy measure for informative prices and a measure that is more consistent with the Price-Informativeness Hypothesis. The implications for these findings are important since it reconciles the lively debate and extremely mixed evidence on the interpretation of the synchronicity measure. After an economically significant fundamental shock to the information environment, higher technical trading returns come from stocks with higher R 2 for the VMA and FMA technical rules, and generally for older (not younger) and bigger stocks with lower turnover. In addition, we observe that the coefficient on the fundamental factor Market-to-Book is now significantly positive. If MTB is a proxy for "growth" stocks (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994) , the result indicates that these companies have higher technical trading returns. When MTB is a proxy for distress French, 1993, 1995) and profitability 9 (Daniel and Titman, 2006; Ecker, Francis, Olsson and Schipper, 2009) Interestingly, the results suggest that fundamental analysis could play a bigger role in the gathering of relevant firm-specific information for decision-making in investing in developing transitional economies determined in establishing the institutional structures and complementary changes in country infrastructure to create incentives for higher quality informational environment and good governance to protect investors' rights.
A higher quality informational environment is important because the risk generated by noise trading can reduce the capital stock and consumption of the economy (De Long et al, 1989) , and also forces managers to focus on the short term, and to bias the choice of investments against long-term projects. Shleifer and Summers (1990) argued that even if investors earn higher average returns from noise trading, it is because they bear more risk than they think. And even if they get rich over time, it is only because they underestimate the risk and get lucky.
There are policy implications in noise trading. Shleifer and Summers (1990) gave the analogy that making it costly for noise traders to bet on the stock market to protect them from their own utility losses is in principle identical to the case for prohibiting casinos, horse races, and state lotteries. In addition, noise trading benefit arbitrageurs who take advantage of noise traders. For instance, when noise traders are optimistic about particular securities, it pays arbitrageurs to create more of them.
These securities might be mutual funds, new share issues, penny oil stocks, or junk bonds: anything that is overpriced at the moment. Just as entrepreneurs spend resources to build casinos to take advantage of gamblers, arbitrageurs build investment banks and brokerage firms to predict and feed noise trader demand. This suggests that regulatory actions could be needed when noise trading is prevalent to regulate the activities of these arbitrageurs taking advantage of the noise traders, as evident from the recent 2008 Financial Crisis with noise traders chasing subprime mortgage assets created by the financial institutions.
Thus, our results appear to suggest that the relationship between technical trading returns and R 2 can also help regulators to assess whether the informational environment is "noisy" or "informative", and make their policy recommendations and regulatory actions accordingly.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We acknowledge that technical trading rules might perhaps not work for certain stocks at the firm-level, and we want to know about the source behind the trading profits or losses from applying these technical rules. We believe that we are the first to empirically establish the link between technical trading returns and stock return synchronicity. An additional and a very simple yet practical statistics -the R 2 -can guide trading decisions using technical trading rules 10 . Imagine that the Bloomberg terminal, Yahoo Finance and financial websites should have an additional statistics -the synchronicity measure -to allow investors and traders to assess how effective their technical analysis can be; for instance, if the informational environment is generally noisy, then the technical traders 10 Volatility is well-known to be persistent (Engle, 1982) and past idiosyncratic volatility, or R 2 , should still have predictive power when longer sample periods are used to compute R 2 .
should focus their efforts on less synchronous or low R 2 stocks to increase their probability of generating abnormal profits. Hypothesis, and generally for older (not younger) and bigger stocks with lower turnover and higher market-to-book (MTB). Thus, without the guide of R 2 , investors should take the market prognosis by all these "alchemists" with their "voodoo" charts with a heavy dose of salt 11 . We thus reconcile the lively debate and extremely mixed evidence on the interpretation of R 2 and its relationship with the cross-sectional returns of stocks.
An economically significant fundamental shock to the information environment also lead to the significance of the Market-to-Book (MTB) ratio, suggesting that growth, distress and profitability (fundamental factors which MTB ratio proxies for) are important determinants to technical trading returns. Thus, fundamental analysis could play a bigger role in the gathering of relevant firm-specific information for decision-making in investing in developing transitional economies determined in establishing the institutional structures and complementary changes in country infrastructure to create incentives for higher quality informational environment and good governance to protect investors' rights.
Our results also appear to suggest that the relationship between technical trading returns and R 2 can also help regulators to assess whether the informational environment is "noisy" or "informative", and make their policy recommendations and regulatory actions accordingly. For instance, when the informational environment is noisy, regulatory actions could be needed to regulate the activities of arbitrageurs taking advantage of the noise traders to protect them from their own utility losses, as evident from the recent 2008 Financial Crisis with noise traders chasing subprime mortgage assets created by the financial institutions.
A cross-country study adapting our research methodology will likely be helpful to assess the relative usefulness and interpretation of R 2 .
Using a Bayesian framework, Treynor and Ferguson (1985) suggest that past prices, when combined with other valuable information, can be helpful in achieving unusual profit. He concludes that: "It is the non-price information that creates the opportunity. The past prices serve only to permit its efficient exploitation." A natural important extension would be to examine the use of fundamental analysis in conjunction with technical analysis, which we leave for future research.
11 The idea of scaling investment signals by the past idiosyncratic volatility of the stock is conveyed in a well-known book to practitioners, "Active Portfolio Management" (Grinold and Kahn 1999) . Jacobs and Levy (1996) provide similar advice.
